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Abstract
This paper examines the growth and income distribution eﬀects of inflation in a grow-
ing economy with heterogeneous households and progressive income taxation. Assuming
that the cash-in-advance constraint applies to investment as well as to consumption spend-
ing, we show that a higher growth of monetary supply yields a negative impact on growth
and an ambiguous eﬀect on income distribution. Numerical example with plausible para-
meter values, however, demonstrate that those long-run eﬀects of inflation tax are rather
small. In contrast, fiscal distortion caused by progressive taxation yield significant im-
pacts on growth and distribution.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the long-run impact of inflation on growth and income distribution in the
presence of heterogeneous households and progressive income taxation. We construct a cash-
in-advance model in which there are two types of households, each of which has diﬀerent time
discount rate. In our setting, the long-run level of relative income and the balanced growth
rate of real income are uniquely determined unless the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
in consumption is suﬃciently high. Provided that the cash-in-advanced constraint applies to
both consumption and to investment spending, we inspect how a change in the growth rate
of nominal money supply aﬀects growth and income distribution in the long-run equilibrium.
We show that a monetary expansion has a negative impact on growth and an ambiguous
eﬀect on income distribution.1 Numerical example with plausible parameter values, however,
demonstrate that the quantitative eﬀects of inflation tax are rather small. In contrast, the
fiscal distortion caused by progressive taxation may yield considerable impacts on growth
and distribution.
2 The Model
Consider a competitive, growing economy with an Ak technology. The aggregate production
function is given by
y = Ak, (1)
where y is output and k is capital stock. Since the production employs capital alone, the
competitive gross rate of return to capital is determined by r = A. As for the consumers’
side, we assume that there are two types of households. Those type of agents diﬀer in the
time discount rates and initial holdings of wealth. We assume that type 1 household is more
impatient than those of type 2. There is a continuum of households and the total number is
normalized to unity. It is assumed that population share of type 1 is θ ∈ (0, 1) and type 2 is
1Several authors examine the growth eﬀect of inflation in the context of representative-agent models of
endogenous growth: see, for example, Chen, Hsu and Lu (2008), De Gregorio (1993), Jha, Wang and Yip
(2002), Jones and Manuelli (1995), Marquis and Reﬀett (1995) and Mino (1997). In general, the foregoing
studies find a negative relation between growth and inflation. The present paper reexamines the same issue
in a prototype model of endogenous model with heterogeneous agents.
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1− θ.
Except for the presence of heterogeneous households, the rest of the setting is standard.
We use a cash-in-advance model in which households face a liquidity constraint for their
investment as well as for consumption expenditure. The objective of type i household maxi-
mizes its discounted sum of utilities
Ui =
Z ∞
0
c1−σi − 1
1− σ e
−ρitdt, σ > 0, ρi > 0, i = 1, 2,
where ci denotes consumption of type i household. By our assumption, the time discount
rate ρi satisfy that ρ1 > ρ2.
The households hold capital and money. The real money balances held by type i household
changes according to
m˙i =
∙
1− ξ
µ
yi
y
¶ε¸
yi − ci − vi − πmi + z, ξ > 0, ε > 0, (2)
where yi, mi, and vi are respectively denote income, real money holding and investment for
physical capital. Additionally, π stands for the rate of inflation and z denotes the lump-sum
transfer from the government. We assume that the government levies progressive income
tax and the rate of tax is specified as ξ
³
yi
y
´ε
, where ε (> 1) represents the degree of pro-
gressiveness of taxation. We have assumed that the total population is one, implying that
y also represents the average per-capita output so that y = θy1 + (1− θ) y2. Since we deal
with a growing economy with persistent expansion of individual income, we assume that the
rate of tax depends on the relative income rather than the absolute level of income. This
formulation follows Guo and Lansing (1998) and Li and Sarte (2004).2 The holding of capital
stock changes in the following manner:
k˙i = vi − δki, 0 < δ < 1, (3)
where ki is capital stock of type i agent and δ denotes the rate of depreciation. In addition to
(2)and (3) , the household’s spending is subject to the cash-in-advance constraint such that
ci + φvi ≤ mi, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. (4)
When φ > 0, the cash-in-advance constraint applies to the investment spending as well.
2See also Sarte (1997).
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The household maximizes Ui subject to (2) , (3) , (4) and the initial holdings of real money
balances and capital stock. Since households earn capital income alone, yi = rki = Aki. As
a result, the relative income in the tax function is expressed as yi/y = ki/k. Considering this
fact, we set up the Hamiltonian function for the household’s optimization problem in such a
way that
Hi =
c1−σi
1− σ + qi
½∙
1− ξ
µ
ki
k
¶ε¸
Aki − ci − vi − πmi + τ
¾
+ηi (vi − δki) + λi (mi − ci − φvi) ,
where qi and ηi respectively denote the shadow values of real money balances and λi is a
Lagrangian multiplier. It is to be noted that when selecting optimal consumption-saving
plan, the household takes future sequences of the average income at the society at large, y,
the rate of inflation, π, and personal transfer, τ , as given. The necessary conditions for an
optimum involve the following:
c−σi = qi + λi, (5)
−qi + ηi − φλi = 0, (6)
q˙i = qi (ρi + π)− λi, (7)
η˙i = (ρi + δ)ηi − qi
µ
1− ξ (1 + ε)
µ
ki
k
¶ε¶
A, (8)
λi (mi − ci − φvi) = 0, λi > 0 and mi − ci − φvi > 0, (9)
lim
t→∞
qi (t)mi (t) e
−ρit = 0; lim
t→∞
ηi (t) ki (t) e
−ρit = 0. (10)
Here, (9) presents the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the cash-in-advance constraint and equa-
tions in (10) are the transversality conditions.
Finally, we assume that the monetary authority keeps the growth rate of nominal money
stock at a positive constant rate, μ, and both the tax revenue and the newly issued money
are distributed back to each households as a transfer. Hence, the government’s flow budget
constraint is z = θτ (y1/y) y1 + (1− θ) τ (y2/y) y2 + μm, where m = θm1 + (1− θ)m2.
3 Balanced-Growth Characterization
In the following we focus on the balanced-growth equilibrium where consumption, capital
and real money holding of each household grow at a common, constant rate. Namely, on the
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balanced-growth path it holds that
c˙i
ci
=
k˙i
ki
=
m˙i
mi
= g, i = 1, 2. (11)
for all t ≥ 0, where g denotes the balanced growth rate. Given those conditions, it is easy to
confirm that the shadow values in the each household optimization conditions also satisfy:
q˙i
qi
=
η˙i
ηi
= γ, i = 1, 2. (12)
for all t ≥ 0. To see the relation between g and γ, we use (5) and (6) to obtain c−σi =³
1− 1φ
´
qi +
1
φηi. Therefore, (11) and (12) mean that
g = − 1
σ
γ. (13)
is held in the balanced-growth equilibrium.
We now denote: xi = ηi/qi and si = ki/k. Then on the balanced-growth path (6) , (7)
and (13) yield
σg =
1
φ
(xi − 1)− ρi − π i = 1, 2. (14)
Similarly, the steady state expression of (8) is
σg =
1
xi
[1− ξ(1 + ε) (si)ε]A− ρi − δ, i = 1, 2. (15)
Notice that the real money balances grow at the rate of g so that π = μ − g holds on the
balanced-growth path. Thus (14) gives
xi = φ [(σ − 1) g + ρi + μ] + 1, i = 1, 2. (16)
Using (15) and (16) , we obtain
(σg + ρi + δ) {φ[(σ − 1) g + ρi + μ] + 1} = A [1− ξ(1 + ε) (si)ε] , i = 1, 2. (17)
By definition, it holds that
θs1 + (1− θ) s2 = 1. (18)
Equations (17) and (18) may determine the steady state level of relative capital holdings
(relative income), s1 and s2, and the balanced-growth rate, g.
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4 Growth and Distributional Eﬀects of Inflation
If the time discount rate is identical (ρ1 = ρ2) , the balanced-growth conditions reduce to
those established in the representative-agent economy. In fact, if ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ, then (17) and
(18) indicate that s = 1. As a result, the balanced-growth rate is determined by
(σg + ρ+ δ) {φ[(σ − 1) g + ρ+ μ] + 1} = A[1− ξ(1 + ε)]. (19)
In this case it is easy to confirm that if φ > 0 and σ ≥ 1, the balanced-growth rate satisfying
(19) is uniquely given and a rise in money growth rate, μ, depresses g.3 In addition, if σ < 1,
then there may exist dual balanced-growth paths. In this case a rise in μ increases the growth
rate of the higher-growth steady state, while it decreases the growth rate of the steady state
with a lower growth rate.
If there is no cash constraint on investment (φ = 0) , equation (17) reduces to
σg + ρi + δ = A [1− ξ(1 + ε) (si)ε] , i = 1, 2
and thus the inflation tax will not aﬀect the long-run growth and distribution.
When ρ1 > ρ2 and φ > 0, we can also confirm that there may exist dual balanced-growth
paths if σ < 1. In what follows, we assume that σ ≥ 1 to focus on the case of unique balanced
growth equilibrium. When σ ≥ 1 the left-hand sides in (17) monotonically increases with g.
We also see that the right-hand side of (17) is a strictly increasing function of si. Hence, in
view of (18) , if the balanced-growth path exists, it must be unique. In this case it is easy to
show that a rise in the money growth rate, μ, depresses the balanced-growth rate, that is, a
higher inflation tax has a negative impact on growth in our two-class economy as well. It is
also seen that the eﬀect of inflation tax on income distribution on the balanced-growth path
is ambiguous.
In order to inspect growth and distributional eﬀects of inflation more clearly, we now
assume that the utility function is logarithmic (σ = 1) . Then (17) and (18) give the following
3 If there are two balanced-growth paths, one with a higher growth rate is locally indeterminate and the
other with a lower growth rate is locally determinate. See Chen and Guo (2008), Meng (2002), Jha, Wang and
Yip (2002), and Suen and Yip (2005) for detailed discussion on the representative-agent Ak growth models
with cash-in-advance constraint.
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equation:
A
φ (ρ1 + μ) + 1
∙
1− ξ(1 + ε)
µ
1
θ + (1− θ) s
¶ε¸
− ρ1
=
A
φ (ρ2 + μ) + 1
∙
1− ξ(1 + ε)
µ
s
θ + (1− θ) s
¶ε¸
− ρ2, (20)
where s = s2/s1 (= k2/k1) . The left-hand side of (20) monotonically increases with s, while
the right-hand side monotonically decreases with s. In addition, when s = 0, our assumption,
ρ1 > ρ2, ensures that
A
φ (ρ1 + μ) + 1
£
1− ξ(1 + ε)θ−ε
¤
− ρ1 <
A
φ (ρ2 + μ) + 1
− ρ2.
Therefore,. there exists a unique positive level of s satisfying (20) and thus the balanced-
growth path is uniquely given. As before, it is easy to show that a rise in the money growth
rate, μ, lowers the balanced-growth rate. On the other hand, the eﬀect of a change in the
money growth rate on the long-run level of relative income, s, depends on the parameter
magnitudes involved in (20) .
We present some numerical examples. The benchmark parameter values concerning the
real side of the economy are the following:
A = 0.12, ρ1 = 0.04, ρ2 = 0.03, ξ = 0.17, ε = 0.6,
φ = 0.2, δ = 0.04, θ = 0.5.
The magnitudes of A, ξ, ε and δ are the same as those used by Li and Sarte (2004). Table 1
(a) shows the benchmark case using the parameter values displayed above. We change the
growth rate of money, μ, from 0.02 up to 0.20. The table indicates that a rise in inflation tax
depresses the long-run growth rate and increases the relative income share of the household
with a lower time discount rate.
Panels (b) and (c) set φ = 0.5 and 1.0, respectively (the other parameters are the same
as those given above.). A rise in φ means that the cash-in-advance constraint for investment
becomes tighter. This directly reduces the long-run growth rate of income, while it increases
the relative income share of type 2 households. In panel (d) we lower ε from 0.6 to 0.4. A
decline in the progressiveness of income tax raises both the balanced-growth rate and the
income share of type 2 households. Panel (e) displays the case where the time discount rate
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of type 2 household is 0.02 instead of 0.03. This small increase in preference divergence
produces a considerable change in the long-run levels of relative income. Finally, Table (f)
treats the case where ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.03, so that the steady-state level of relative income, s, is
always unity.
Table 1
μ s g
0.02 1.636 0.0188
0.04 1.639 0.0184
0.10 1.648 0.0174
0.15 1.659 0.0165
0.20 1.665 0.0154
μ s g
0.02 1.672 0.0173
0.04 1.689 0.0165
0.10 1.704 0.0139
0.15 1.724 0.0118
0.20 1.745 0.0099
μ s g
0.02 1.810 0.0088
0.04 1.823 0.0065
0.10 1.884 0.0023
0.15 1.933 − 0.0009
0.20 1.984 − 0.0039
(a) Bench mark (b) φ = 0.5 (c) φ = 1.0
μ s g
0.02 2.404 0.0274
0.04 2.408 0.0234
0.10 2.433 0.0221
0.15 2.454 0.0218
0.20 2.475 0.0203
μ s g
0.02 2.802 0.0249
0.04 2.814 0.0243
0.10 2.852 0.0234
0.15 2.884 0.0223
0.20 2.917 0.0215
μ s g
0.02 1.0 0.0304
0.04 1.0 0.0291
0.10 1.0 0.0266
0.15 1.0 0.0244
0.20 1.0 0.0223
(d) ε = 0.4 (e) ρ1 = 0.04, ρ2 = 0.02 (f) ρ1 = ρ2 = 0.03, φ = 0.5
Our numerical exercises reveal that a monetary expansion have a negative impact on long-
run growth rate of income and a positive impact on the relative income share of the agents
with a lower time discount rate. It is shown that although the degree of cash constraint
for investment (the level of φ) has a relatively large eﬀects on growth, the quantitative
eﬀect of a change in money growth (so the long-run inflation) is considerably small.4 In
contrast, the degree of heterogeneity of households (diﬀerence in time discount rates) and the
4As claimed by Temple (2000), the empirical investigations on inflation and growth have not reach a
consensus. Many studies, however, indicate that the relation between inflation and growth is relatively weak
in countries with moderate inflation: see, for example, Barro (1996). Our numerical examples confirm this
finding even in the presence of income distributional eﬀect of inflation.
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progressiveness of income tax may produce much larger impacts on growth and distribution.
However, it is needless to add that our finding depends on a specific modelling of inflation,
growth and distribution. Further investigations based on more general formulations would
be relevant.
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